The International Situation
Naturally, the situation steadily worsened in countries where they had previously refused permission to translate AD&D. Just consider that AD&D was no longer the market leader even in our region: people mostly played local games, and we were already hearing about pirate Polish translations of M.A.G.U.S. and their possible legalisation. TSR had gradually lost most of a market. In our region alone this certainly meant several thousand players; a figure around 10,000 would not be surprising either. All right: that means roughly half a million dollars, 1% of the 1996 revenue. But if we also consider that Sweden had adopted its own system, as had several other smaller or larger markets, the loss was much greater. Or should I mention German systems too?
A revenue difference of a few per cent can strain a company all by itself. But that was not the real problem. The world had become more international: more people could read about which games were popular where, pirate translations could circulate, and numerous other systems could spread. TSR handled this situation particularly badly. At a time when every cent counted, these cents counted too. The outlook grew darker, though occasional products still seemed to offer a way out of this hopeless situation.
Dragon Dice arrived as a lifeline in 1996, initially looking successful. TSR also decided that if its more expensive hardcover novels had sold well so far, it would now try twelve novels a year. With the failure of the Dragon Dice expansions, the company's revenues began to shrink relatively quickly. Revenue of forty million dollars did not look particularly good, mainly because the till was almost empty. Every cent lost in smaller markets or through justly unpopular decisions was sorely missed. The novels were not selling either, and returns of unsaleable books brought unexpected and ultimately unmanageable costs. When Random House returned a large shipment of unsold and unsaleable novels, TSR had to pay for the returns too, and became insolvent almost immediately. That left it no prospect of releasing new products either. The options looked anything but bright.
Bankruptcy and debt restructuring appeared possible, as did selling certain rights or finding an investor willing to invest in the company, perhaps buy it outright. I doubt it will surprise anyone to hear that Wizards of the Coast, rapidly fattened by Magic's success, bought the publisher in 1997. TSR would not live to see Baldur's Gate released as an independent company, nor have to fight WOW: it had merged into a much younger company enriched by the card-game market. The Williams era was over. It would be easy to say that the much weaker than expected performance of Dragon Dice and the novels directly caused the collapse, but that would hardly be fair to those products. Dragon Dice began with unexpected success, and most of the novels started strongly too. The unrealistic expectation of infinite growth from a finite market, and the problems behind those expectations, had already existed for years, in several areas.
TSR took too many risks and did not even try to place its riskier ventures in separate companies so their failure would not destroy the parent. That alone is a serious mistake for a company trying to escape its problems through a succession of risky manoeuvres. It was equally serious that numerous risky product lines, generally made unprofitable by mass production, were neither sold nor entrusted to outside developers nor opened to independent developers. A substantial proportion of these risky products produced losses, worsening TSR's position still further.
And spending money on legal action against fans, shutting down fan sites because they featured graphics and brand names connected to TSR products, was bad in several ways. The direct effect was that these legal battles cost money, often considerable money. Money spent on lawyers did not and could not pay for itself. I am not saying it would have covered Random House's returns bill, but it would have given the company more room to manoeuvre. Furthermore, the people behind those fan sites and fanzines were TSR's biggest customers. After the lawsuits, they had to face the fact that other games and publishers offered a friendlier environment. The third serious problem was that TSR turned much of its community against itself while reducing its products' value for money, partly through fewer players and partly through less freely available support.
And some players remembered earlier affairs and said it might be worth supporting D&D's competitors too. In many people's eyes TSR was a more hated company than even Microsoft.