The story dubbed "the roleplaying murderers" received a great deal of media coverage. On this subject, however, I tried to ask police officers, prosecutors, judges, and even a defense attorney. Their answers were surprising. They all consider the well-known fact that Hungary has a high conviction rate in prosecuted cases to be the result of complex processes. There is a procedure called substitute private prosecution, used when the prosecution service does not want to bring charges but the victim or their representative does. And a significant proportion of those cases end with a court finding sufficient what the prosecution service had considered insufficiently proven to charge someone.
An important difference from what we see in American films is that here the prosecution service does more than present the prosecution's case. While familiar American films show all sorts of things immediately requiring judicial authorization, in Hungary a substantial part of supervising an investigation falls to prosecutors, so many things require prosecutorial authorization. Even if every authorization is requested from the same prosecutor, there will still be a prosecutor overseeing the gathering of evidence, who can say at any time that the suspicion is not sufficiently well founded for the proposed step.
By the time someone is convicted, the case has passed through the detective, the investigating officer, the prosecutor overseeing individual actions, and of course the prosecutor presenting the charges. A court cannot independently decide matters requiring specialist expertise, so numerous experts will probably give their opinions in the case. Nobody reaches court merely because they are a roleplayer, even if a judge happens to hate roleplayers. Having a prejudice or preconception about a hobby is itself a problem.
Section 14 (1) A person may not act as a judge if
(e) for any other reason, an impartial assessment of the case cannot be expected of them.
I think that provision is interesting. Yes, even in a fight between supporters of two football clubs, for example, ideally the judge will not be a supporter, and so on: there will be nothing that could influence them. A judge who is uninformed and ignorant about roleplaying, however, is entirely possible, because in that case they will rely precisely on the arguments heard in court. In this way, being a roleplayer becomes incriminating in a court proceeding if experts persuade the ignorant, uninformed judge.
In a few special cases, the problem is that someone so unfamiliar with a subject that they cannot ask the right questions cannot be expected to assess the case impartially, because even with expert assistance they cannot understand it and therefore cannot truly judge it. That is an objective obstacle to impartial judgment. But when this becomes apparent, practically nobody will report it. The appellate court will remedy it later, usually by ordering a retrial at first instance because the judgment lacked a proper factual basis.
There are several other questions too. If a case has a few decisive pieces of evidence, it is a straightforward case. A single judge can easily decide it at first instance; at second or third instance, a single judge never decides. A panel of three, or rarely five, decides there.
Section 13 (1) Unless otherwise provided by this Act, the court of first instance shall sit as a single judge.
(2) The court of first instance shall sit as a panel of three professional judges if the single judge has referred the case to a panel of the court. A case referred to a panel may not subsequently be heard by a single judge.
(4) The courts of second and third instance shall sit as panels of three professional judges.
Another interesting section was brought to my attention:
Section 496. By the conclusion of the preparatory hearing, the court shall refer the case to a panel of three professional judges if it considers this necessary in view of the complexity of the case, the volume of case documents, the number of persons participating in the criminal proceedings, or for any other reason.
"Any other reason" initially sounds like a catch-all provision. But regarding complexity, it was pointed out that a case can be complex for two reasons. One is that the act itself is complicated and involves many different strands. The other is that a great deal of direct evidence of different kinds must be weighed, and it must be decided whether it forms a closed logical system capable of establishing proof. Where a case could not be clarified for a long time, the first proceedings proved insufficient, and so forth, there may be ample grounds for this.
After several particularly ugly judicial errors, it emerged that the judge had relied on the material presented and accepted the charges uncritically. Sometimes poor defense work contributes to this; at other times it is excessive trust in the prosecution service. In relation to the present case, police officer, prosecutor, and judge all drew my attention to the same point: the investigation discontinued by the prosecution service. And they noted that, without analyzing this particular case, discontinued proceedings that are subsequently reopened generally create an interesting situation.
Viewed through the defense attorney's eyes, we must say that at this point there was not even enough information to continue the investigation. Yet it was already known that the accused could have taken the victim into the woods at any time, that they were present during the search, and several other factors that weigh against them in the evidence. But there seemed no justification for interviewing witnesses from their circle or keeping group members under surveillance to see whether they discussed the murder. Even the person who later gave testimony was hardly questioned or checked. Here, a single witness statement separates we do not know what happened from life imprisonment.
And many facts were interpreted in the light of that testimony.
Many prosecutors, some judges, and those acting in the victim's interests see it differently. To them, the prosecution service reversing an earlier decision when continuing the case means the testimony is persuasive, matches the other evidence, and has passed through a strongly skeptical prosecution service that has already considered most potential counterarguments.
When an appellate court sends a case back to first instance, a judge who took part in the earlier trial cannot participate. Even so, it is hard to rule out the subconscious thought that this is already a retrial at first instance. The judge must consciously bear that in mind too, since that is how they can be even more thorough in establishing the facts. They must also follow the additional guidance in the decision ordering the retrial, perhaps placing greater emphasis on a particular subject. But that information also works subconsciously, and it may occur to them that the prosecution has already persuaded another judge.
And of course, when the defense requests acquittal, it matters whether the argument is lack of proof or absence of an offense. The latter can mean two things. If the act described in the charges is not a criminal offense, that is absence of an offense; if the court considers that the act described did not happen, an act that never happened is not an offense either. The defense attorney, meanwhile, rightly thinks: the evidence was initially insufficient for the prosecutor too, it does not persuade me, and it did not persuade the appellate court.
The press received differing information. Some said theft also bound the group together; others mentioned only the game. From the outside, it is hard to decide whether theft was invented in one place and repeated elsewhere, or was an allegation also heard during the proceedings but currently unproven, which not every journalist stayed to hear in full. Settling that dispute in print using information from the court would be remarkably tasteless. But it is also certain that the court may hear various characterizations of the people involved during hearings, and may pay attention to them.
And I must say that the issue of theft is particularly interesting. It does not only say, "ugh, the nasty, evil defendants are criminals anyway, since that was their common bond." It says the victim was a criminal, and many people might have had a motive to act against him. If the original intention was primarily to recover stolen property and make the threats needed to do so—in legal terms, unlawful self-help—then the perpetrator could, for example, be someone else, and premeditation would not be established either, making the legal assessment much less severe. Raising theft could therefore form part of an argument that someone else committed a different crime.
And below a certain value, theft is only a petty offense. It does not form part of the charges, the court cannot adjudicate it, and it would later be very hard to prove who stole what, or even the timing relevant to limitation periods. There is no chance of the press thoroughly analyzing these questions.
Likewise, assessing the subject of roleplaying is neither one-dimensional nor, especially, simple.
Here we need to discuss the fourth companion's testimony. Had he been present at the time of the crime, he would probably also be either dead or a defendant, with his testimony serving only as a major mitigating factor. Who told you what is indirect evidence at best and can be interpreted in many ways. Situations like this are always difficult because the witness may also have misunderstood something. Some jurisdictions categorically exclude such evidence; in others, freedom of proof permits it, but it must be handled extremely carefully. And this is one of the points where roleplaying complicates matters.
For roleplayers, the question Jani has disappeared; what are you doing about the situation? may also refer to his character still being present. The character needs to be written out of the story, and reality may inspire the slaughter of that character.
I know the victim's name here is not Jani; this is only an example. Nobody will discuss specific cases, since there is no final judgment, and neither judges nor prosecutors comment on the particular case. They can, however, discuss problems that generally arise in such matters, and one or more examples can emerge. This example shows why police learning secondhand about a conversation the other party may have misunderstood is extremely weak evidence in such a case. When police, prosecutors, or the court decide how to handle such testimony, they fundamentally have to decide one thing: did the premeditated, cruel murder resolve an in-game situation when play could resume after the investigation was closed; was it reality; or does the case mix reality with fiction?
It is easy to say that LARP blurs the line between reality and fantasy. That in particular actions—whom you hit, for instance—the boundary between player and character becomes blurred. If a LARP frightens or shocks outsiders, situations can arise that raise the issue of disorderly conduct. If it creates danger, other charges may be brought against the organizer too. But purchases, research connected to the game, and preparation also matter here.
My case does not involve LARP, but before incorporating ergot into an adventure, I did more than look up how many historical events are suspected of involving it. I have it easy: many specialists at NÉBIH and the CDC are happy to answer questions, recommend references, and so on, because they welcome public interest in food safety. I thank them here too for their help. But if my name came up in an LSD-related case, a police officer, prosecutor, or judge would have a hell of a time deciding whether I had asked only for the game or wanted to make LSD.
And with LARP too, it matters what exactly is involved. In many cases it is combined with historical reenactment. How realistic is it, how dangerous could it be, and how far might fantasy blend with reality? If an expert in a prolonged proceeding once labels someone prone to blending the two in a potentially dangerous way, and that evidence does not somehow get thrown out, it may influence the judge. But if a judge does not understand an issue, even though expert opinions agree, they will have great difficulty deciding whether a statement concerns something uncertain that cannot be weighed against the accused, or something entirely certain that must be weighed against them.
In many experts' opinions, the answers about risks and why particular things should not be confused appear precise. Mixing in-character and out-of-character matters is dangerous. The judge hears about in-character values, props also appearing out of character, and many shocking expressions, and sees a constant, significant source of danger. They see that confusing the in-character and out-of-character worlds can, in the worst case, lead to disaster. But they lack the knowledge to distinguish that dangerous confusion from the apparently blurred boundary in LARP. To put it mildly, the severity that emerges in such situations is rarely upheld on appeal.
A judge asked how I saw this as a roleplayer: if the inadequate statement of facts at first instance failed to explain the roleplaying aspect—what is in character, what is out of character, what is mixed up, and why it is dangerous—so that a judge unfamiliar with roleplaying must pay particular attention to it in the retrial, what happens? Not a better understanding of the problem, with numerous roleplayers appointed as ad hoc experts to establish the facts. Not even looking for someone at the regional court of appeal whose hobby this is, sitting down to play Shadowrun or D&D, and asking them discreetly. Instead, a need to satisfy expectations will make the judge mention roleplaying more often than necessary in the reasoning. Yes, they will ask more about its dangers, allow themselves to be persuaded more readily, collect more information, and feed the experts leading questions on the subject.
If the regional court of appeal does not appreciate that effort, the case can be batted back and forth for quite a while. If the first-instance court cannot reach a properly founded decision, the judge plainly neither understands nor can assess the situation, and therefore cannot be expected to assess it impartially and should have been disqualified long ago, the case goes back to first instance. There have already been many examples of judgments set aside repeatedly, and with such returns for an encore, there is no obstacle to setting one aside yet again.
A hell of a lot of evidence is direct without necessarily being reliable or decisive. It is no accident that even cases with direct evidence require much else. There is plenty of reliable indirect evidence, and taken together it may establish the case much more strongly than a few pieces of direct evidence. Here it was said that the prosecution rests on indirect evidence. Given the many hearing days and the resulting pile of files, one can suspect that it includes plenty of strong, good evidence that reliably narrows the field of suspects.
But until there was testimony, it was not enough to decide the case. Obviously, insofar as new evidence could be obtained after the testimony, with stronger suspicion allowing its details to be checked and many points confirmed, perhaps corroborating the testimony itself, much changed after the prosecution service's decision to discontinue proceedings. The problem is that much of the new evidence available is indirect too. The even bigger problem is that, when checking testimony, it may not always be possible to know whether an item mentioned in a secondhand account potentially describing a game or LARP was acquired for LARP or for a crime.
It is in the public interest that a sufficiently large proportion of judges capable of meaningfully reviewing first-instance decisions on such questions should hear appeals. But when a judge points to unresolved roleplaying issues as part of an inadequate factual basis, it would look rather odd to attach contact details for the weekend Shadowrun or D&D group, so people could try it and understand what is in character and what is out of character, why the distinction matters, and why and how confusing them is bad.
(5) In the case specified in subsection (3)(c), a judge who participated in the decision setting aside the earlier judgment is not excluded from reviewing the decision issued following the repeated proceedings.
In other words, a panel consisting of the same judges can send the case back to first instance several more times in such circumstances.
But roleplaying matters beyond these witness statements. When someone tries to challenge the prosecution's assertions by proposing their own possible account of events, the judge faces an interesting problem: many stories are too improbable even to raise reasonable doubt and challenge the proof. Yet it is also hard to imagine either a criminal or a lawyer putting together that particular story. A lawyer would focus on legally relevant points, and one would hardly expect such a story from the average suspect. From a writer or a roleplayer, however, one might.
If a roleplayer became dangerous because they too confused in-character and out-of-character matters, but can distinguish right from wrong and can therefore be punished rather than subjected to compulsory treatment, the court will also consider the chances of addressing that problem in prison and whether their risk of reoffending is greater. It will consider what either many biased experts or a few impartial ones say.
A further problem in assessing roleplaying games is the opinions of many experts whose objectivity is questionable. And remember, a judge cannot really override unanimous expert opinions on a specialist issue, because officially they lack the expertise. How long should they keep appointing experts? Wanting to hear a particular opinion would not be impartial. There has been a case in the history of the justice system in which, faced with being unable really to contradict the expert, a judge deliberately incorporated the excessively problematic parts of the expert opinion into the judgment's reasoning with excessive emphasis, because "the appellate court will send it back," and after their objections, many things become easier to challenge.
With LARP, however, a scene open to misunderstanding can also produce interesting testimony. Alongside who threatened whom and how, testimony in international practice has already raised the question of how furiously people were hitting each other and what they were shouting while doing so.
Roleplaying is also interesting because, when obtaining expert opinions, courts often struggle to decide who has relevant expertise in it. As far as I know, the subject has been studied by psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists, among others, alongside mathematicians analyzing systems and people studying literature. What becomes of roleplayers, what risks arise, and what is common have been examined by many people from many perspectives. And in many cases they may be accused of seeing only a small slice of those involved.
Nevertheless, everyone agrees on a few things. The partial information published in the media makes the case difficult, indeed impossible, to judge, and has spawned some quite wild assumptions. Nobody is convicted merely for being a roleplayer; quite a lot of evidence and expert opinion emerges in these cases. Finally, this problem is not specific to roleplaying. Traffic cases are often decided by judges who do not have driving licenses. Though I do know of a judge who even has a category C license. And he says that if a judge entirely unfamiliar with vehicles, and therefore with traffic, issues an unfounded judgment, that too is sent back to first instance.
Although a judge who cannot assess a case at all for lack of sufficient knowledge cannot be expected to assess it impartially either, current legal practice does not normally report or examine this. Surprisingly rarely does legal practice interpret examining the ability to judge impartially as also requiring the ability to judge the case at all.