It is almost a cliché: when playing Call of Cthulhu, a single bad decision can cost a character their life and come back to haunt them. Nor is it the first time we have heard that a modern-setting game is generally more realistic than a fantasy game. Really? Then what happens if your character wants to buy something on credit? Realistically, most characters could do so, except that we would then have to track the consequences of borrowing. Let me tell you: few GMs or game masters would allow it. After all, what would be the point of accounting for a character's wealth anywhere if they could take out a loan they never have to repay during play? If they die in the adventure, that is why; if they go insane, that is why... And if neither happens, not enough time passes. Yet this question is also part of making the game world truly realistic. Not merely because of credit, but because we live in a society based on individuals making responsible decisions. Exclude the possibility of bad decisions in general, and we soon find our characters in a sterile world.
If we aim for realism, we must choose a world where a character can be annoyed that they voted for the wrong party, should not have bought that car, learned the wrong trade or took out the wrong loan. Where they can be frustrated that, in a society built on responsible decisions, they cannot always decide responsibly. Either they lack the information or cannot grasp it. Or, if characters cannot take out loans, at least let there be an adventure in which someone struggling with debt becomes interested in certain forms of magic after receiving a televised "money-attracting spell" in exchange for a premium-rate phone call. Then they turn to a cult that also promises money, become a dangerous cultist and form the basis of an adventure.
An adventure would have little depth with the simplicity of "we have our one cultist; the five-year plan allocates exactly that many per adventure". It therefore does no harm to describe how a cultist the characters investigate and fight drifted towards darkness after one bad decision after another. Many bad decisions can play a part here. After bad political, technological or economic decisions, someone brought low may seek refuge in all kinds of dark cults. That is one human route; another is the route of someone hungry for power. There can be many others. This is another reason it matters to try to place character types within the world of each period.
We could give many examples of people failing to understand, even afterwards, why a decision was wrong. But many examples are easily dismissed. That is why I use foreign-currency loans as an example. If, as private individuals, we cannot grasp many of the connections, the question naturally arises of how we could handle them convincingly as game masters. I was astonished when a professional working on grant applications and certain economic tasks criticised the financial system by describing a situation that has not existed since the Great Depression. In other words, they did not know how and why banks create money today, or why making this a state monopoly would be unwise. In our article on insanity, we discussed where and how increasing conspiracy theories, paranoia and detachment from reality can lead. I would add that this can also make people more inclined to set aside questions about alternatives. It strengthens political extremes, but can also turn many people into mad cultists.
On the question of foreign-currency versus forint loans, even economic experts wrote that we could choose between exchange-rate risk and interest-rate risk. Who, on that basis, allowed for substantial interest-rate risk? All this in a society centred on individuals' responsible decisions and basing its operation on them. We cannot responsibly take out loans or choose between programmes concerning regulation of the banking system. Do you think everyone is wise after the event? Not so. Years later, we still talk about exchange rates, although interest-rate risk also caused substantial problems.
Many say that money lent by a bank is fictitious money created by the bank. Let me tell you something. Banks do not print money, and much money is created not when a loan is made, but in connection with your bank deposit. Do you not believe it? It is dead simple. You earn interest on money deposited in the bank because the bank can use that money. Right? So that money remains in the economy, BUT meanwhile you also have money in your account that you can transfer. The money created this way is not unbacked: another person's debt and the collateral they offer provide the backing for your account money, bank deposit and so on.
As long as people do not withdraw money from the banking system en masse, this works. You have transferable account money; someone else has cash. There is already more means of payment in the economy. The user of the money pays interest, the bank deducts its costs and profit—its fee for the work—and the depositor receives interest. For some time now, the bank's profit has not belonged to the bankers either: these are joint-stock credit institutions, so it is the shareholders, rather than the bank, who grow wealthier. A small investor keeping money in OTP shares instead of a bank deposit, for example. This is how the banking system creates money; this is where the big sums are. Contrary to the legendary mega-profits, many banks make losses both in Hungary and around the world. That is why bank failures occur, for example.
This is a good solution to the earlier shortage of means of payment. But there is a problem: the appearance of account money multiplies money, which can lead to inflation. We must somehow prevent the same money being deposited too many times, which would lead to infinite money and infinite inflation. The solution seemed simple: what if borrowers did not receive the gold either, but only paper certifying that it existed? If that was insufficient, let two, three or four people receive such paper. Credit would become cheaper. This system was still terribly rigid and so on, but it specified exactly how much gold backed each unit of banknotes: the gold standard. Interest from several borrowers had to finance one depositor's interest and the bank's profit. That really was a terrific business. And every risk people mention about multiplying money this way is real, as is its unfairness.
What changed? Today, banks' money creation is constrained differently. When you receive a loan, it is now money of full value. You can deposit it in a bank, which can lend again, and so on. But it cannot lend as much as the deposit: part must be held in reserve. In addition to the mandatory reserve ratio, many situations require specific provisions to cover risks. So a loan of 100 francs certainly involves more than 100 francs in "deposits". Of course, some of this is not an ordinary bank deposit or current account: investors put money into the business by buying securities, such as bonds or MBS. But the result is similar. Even when the "depositor" is the parent bank, another bank, the bank's own shareholders and so on. Consequently, even a bank seeking no profit would have to charge a higher interest rate than it pays.
Higher risk requires greater provisions. The bank therefore needs more invested money for the same amount of lending. It has to pay interest to more people, and more interest in total. Moreover, since risk remains even then, the depositor also expects to be paid for that risk or for insurance eliminating it. Risk can therefore push up loan interest and the annual percentage rate, or APR. This does not mean the bank is profiteering. When banks need a lot of capital for loans and little is available, supply and demand also enter the picture: the bank again pays more and more for its funding and passes that on to borrowers in some form. Not because it is nasty or evil, but because it has no alternative.
It can do this in two ways. EITHER the loan's interest rate varies, or it charges a higher rate from the outset to fund various risks, seeks long-term financing and so on, with the higher interest being the price you pay for the loan. Anyone choosing a loan where the bank can change interest rates because it is cheaper should prepare for this. They should not be surprised if risks, provisions and so on raise the interest they pay. Do you know what happens? The wonderfully favourable foreign-currency loan initially found is almost suspiciously cheap, even allowing for some exchange-rate risk. Suppose the principal is 10 million, the term 240 months and the interest rate offered to a VIP client 4.80%. The best repayment amount will certainly come from an annuity loan, so if neither the interest rate nor the exchange rate changed, we would repay in equal instalments. For now, ignore costs other than interest.
For our first calculation, forget exchange-rate risk and assume a stable exchange rate. We have a monthly repayment of about 44,000 forints, of which around 40,000 pays interest and about 4,000 repays principal. We have not yet allowed for a grace period or anything similar. Time passes; now 5,000 of the 44,000 forints goes to principal and 39,000 to interest. What happens if the loan becomes a little riskier and interest must rise? Say, one percentage point for the country-risk premium and 0.2 to cover provisions, making the rate 6%. Let me help: interest becomes 48,750 forints, principal repayment remains 5,000, and the instalment is therefore 53,750. Calculate what happens if, within the "maximum 2–3%" change, the rate reaches 7.2%. An instalment well above 60,000 forints, right? And we have not included a grace period and so on, making the change less drastic here. In practice, interest was lower than this and APR higher, but rising fees and interest could still produce a similar effect.
The lesson: if interest starts low, even small changes can be drastic relative to it. As long as most of our repayment goes towards interest, the repayment rises by a similar proportion too. What happens when exchange-rate risk also appears? The instalment becomes proportionately larger, of course; all well and good. But if, instead of 44,000 forints, a repayment of CHF 275 rises to around 410 francs while the franc's exchange rate rises from 160 to 240 forints, the repayment becomes 98,400 forints. With the franc costing one and a half times as much, the repayment more than doubles. In a crisis, even budgeting for the original repayment would not have been easy. If exchange-rate risk alone had applied, the repayment would have risen to 66,000 forints: an extra 22,000 a month. Yet the interest-rate risk dismissed as "minor" amounted to more than another 33,000 forints. Could we really choose between interest-rate risk and exchange-rate risk?
Naturally, interest-rate risk materialised for forint loans too. We can discuss those amounts as well. But the proportional changes were different. Even to this day, however, those who borrowed in francs rather than forints came out better. And this is not the only problem. Had the crisis struck later, many things would have happened differently. Interest would then have accounted for a smaller share of repayments and principal a larger share, so interest-rate risk would have raised repayments less. Additional periods of economic growth would also have left us facing the problem from a better income position. That would in turn have reduced risk, increases in interest and so on. The ratio between outstanding principal and the value of the property serving as collateral would also have differed, making it easier to sell homes at a good price, settle matters and start a new life. Here, the timing, nature and depth of the crisis are a much greater problem for loans than either exchange-rate risk or interest-rate risk on its own.
So we can say not only that practically nobody understood every important consideration and that the problem was almost incomprehensibly complex, but also that, even afterwards, we generally do not receive a complete, credible account of what happened and why. Without a believable official position, many people conclude that the system simply does not work. Or does not work as it should. If they see no normal, understandable operation, they can easily seek alternative explanations and become susceptible to influence. That leads to a very bad situation.
Of course, you can say this is an extreme example. But we could discuss software licences, security vulnerabilities and many other issues in just the same way: issues where people usually cannot make rational decisions, and where the absence of a good official explanation erodes faith in the accepted account. This leads some people to flee reality. Some into a group awaiting miracles, others into a game. Either way, though, this process makes an excellent foundation for an adventure.
Where do you think this situation leads? What other everyday decision can change the course of someone's life? What other decisions would you build an adventure around?